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COMMENTS 
EscHEAT - ABANDONED PROPERTY - FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 
AS A BAR TO MULTIPLE EscHEAT OF !NTANGIBLES-Escheat of 
abandoned or unclaimed property by the sovereign is as old as the 
common law.1 Recast in constitutional form, this ancient right 
of kings has become a significant source of revenue in an increas-
ing number of American states.2 While the right of escheat is 
inherent in the power of a sovereign, its exercise requires specific 
legislative authority. Until recently this authority was sparingly 
given and escheat was generally limited to the administration of 
estates3 and abandoned tangible property. 4 However, in this past 
decade, state legislatures have greatly expanded the scope and 
extent of escheat by authorizing the escheat of abandoned in-
tangiblel$ property.6 Spurred by the urgent demands of public 
finance and the successes of other states, few legislatures will be 
able to resist for long this scent of unclaimed millions in non-tax 
revenue.7 
Unfortunately, the escheat of intangible property raises serious 
problems not presented when tangible property is involved. The 
major problem is that of multiple escheat - the possibility that a 
17 HOLDSWORTH, A H1srORY OF ENGLISH LAw 495-96 (2d ed. 1937); IO id. at 350 (1938). 
2 McBride, Unclaimed Dividends, Escheat Statutes and the Corporation Lawyer, 14 
Bus. LAw. 1062 (1959). 
3 Two related issues are presented here: devolution of property to the state on failure 
of heirs or other takers, e.g., Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S. 356 (1915) (land); 
Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911) (personalty); Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256 (1896) 
(land), and power of the state to administer the estates of missing persons, e.g., Cunnius 
v. Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458 (1904). 
4 McBride, supra note 2, at 1063. 
5 See Ely, Escheats: Perils and Precautions, 15 Bus. LAw. 791, 793-94 (1960), for illus-
trations of the kinds of intangible property subject to escheat today. Examples include 
stock, dividends, unredeemed cafeteria coupons, and bribe money offered a public official. 
6 McBride, supra note 2, at 1063, and Ely, supra note 5, at 791-92, list the following 
states as having statutes covering the escheat of intangible property: Arizona (1956), Alaska 
(1921), Arkansas (1949), California (1959), Connecticut (1949), Kentucky (1940), Massa• 
chusetts (1950), Montana (1895), Michigan (1947), New Jersey (1946), New Mexico (1959), 
New York (1944), North Carolina (1947), Oregon (1957), Pennsylvania (1915), Utah (1957), 
Virginia (1960), and Washington (1955). 
7 "Corporate stocks and dividends represent a significant, if indeterminate, source of 
potential revenue. A single illustration of such a source is found in one corporation 
which holds $180,000 in unclaimed dividends and has $200,000 outstanding in uncashed 
dividend checks. The value of the stock underlying these dividends must also be taken 
into consideration." Quoted by McBride, supra note 2, at 1062, from a comment by an 
cscheat subcommittee in its report to the California legislature prior to enactment of 
California escheat legislation in 1959. 
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holder8 of abandoned intangible property may be required by 
successive escheat proceedings in different states to disgorge the 
full value of the property to each. This problem arises primarily 
because of present jurisdictional theory. Under present theories, 
any state having sufficient "contact" with the transaction creating 
the intangible, and thereby able to serve the holder ·with process, 
is held to have jurisdiction for the purposes of escheat.9 Where 
the holder is an interstate corporation it is clear that at least two 
states could have jurisdiction: the state of incorporation,10 and the 
state where the corporation conducts a significant amount of busi-
ness relating to that intangible.11 In its decision in Standard Oil 
Co. v. New Jersey, a majority of the Supreme Court stated that the 
full faith and credit clause would prevent multiple escheat.12 It 
is the purpose of this comment to examine and evaluate this theory 
in the setting of escheat of intangible property. 
I. THE NATURE OF EscHEAT 
The term "escheat" has many meanings today. Historically, 
"escheat" was a doctrine of succession to real property upon failure 
of descent. When a tenant in fee simple died without heirs or 
committed a felony his land reverted to the crown or mesne lord 
by "escheat."13 In this sense, "escheat" depended upon feudal 
systems of tenure. Since "escheat" applied only to real property, 
and since feudal systems of tenure are not generally utilized in 
this country, the term is now rarely used in this historical sense. 
Rather, the term is commonly used today without reference to the 
8 In this comment, the term "holder" will be used to mean any person or corporation 
in possession of property belonging to another, no matter how the obligation or possession 
arose. Examples include trustee in case of a trust, debtor in case of debt, and corporation in 
case of stock. This convenient terminology corresponds to that utilized in the Uniform 
Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act § I. The term "owner" is similarly defined for 
the purposes of this comment to mean, e.g., beneficiary in case of trust or creditor in case 
of debt. "Owner" and "holder" therefore refer to the parties between which an obligation 
- the "intangible property" - exists. 
o Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948). 
l0Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951). 
11 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948). See dissent of Jus-
tices Douglas and Black in Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, supra note 10, at 445, for 
additional possibilities. 
12 "The debts or demands represented by the stock and dividends having been taken 
from the appellant company by a valid judgment of New Jersey, the same debts or 
demands against appellant cannot be taken by another state. The Full Faith and Credit 
Clause bars any such double escheat." Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U. s. 428, 443 
(1951). 
1s See 3 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 67-72 (3d ed. 1923); 10 id. at 350 
(1938). 
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particular theory underlying the action to indicate the action of a 
state in transferring title or possession of property to itself. For 
convenience and simplicity the term "escheat" will be used in this 
generic sense - indicating only the action of a state in transferring 
title or possession to abandoned property to itself. 
It is often suggested14 that the power to escheat abandoned 
property is derived from the ancient doctrines of bona vacantia.1 r, 
At common law, abandoned personal property, tangible or intang-
ible,16 could be transferred to the crmvn by virtue of the king's 
prerogative. Certain classes of abandoned property were desig-
nated bona vacantia and thereby taken out of the operation of 
common law rules relating to "finders";17 the classes of abandoned 
property so designated included "treasure trove," "·wreck," "waif," 
"estrays," and the property of an intestate without next of kin.18 
Bona vacantia was therefore simply an exception to the rules of 
title by occupation. The rationale underlying bona vacantia was 
stated by Blackstone to be the prevention of "that strife and con-
tention, which the mere title of occupancy is apt to create and 
continue, and to provide for the support of public authority in a 
manner the least burdensome to individuals .... "19 Title to the 
property went to the king, not as ultimus heres, but by the jus 
regalia - that is, the king did not take as "last heir," or by "para-
mount title," as in the case of escheat in its historical sense, but 
through the exercise of his prerogative.20 The extent to which the 
common law of bona vacantia is applicable to this country depends 
upon whether the king's prerogative rights have been assimilated 
as a part of the sovereign powers of the state. Since it would seem 
that the rationale underlying bona vacantia is well adapted to 
assimilation as one of the "police powers" of a sovereign state, this 
ancient doctrine should provide more than ample authority for 
modern escheat if historical justification is required.21 
14 E.g., Anderson Nat'! Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944); Ely, Pennsylvania Esclieat 
Laws: Proposals for Revision, 64 DICK. L. REv. 329, 331-33 (1960); McBride, supra note 2, 
at 1063; Garrison, Esclieats, Abandoned Property Acts, and Their Revenue Aspects, 35 KY. 
L.J. 302, 302-04 (1947). 
15 "Vacant, unclaimed, or stray goods." BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY 223 (4th ed. 1951). 
16 "[A]ny personal property whether chattels personal or chattels real and whether 
choses in possession or choses in action may be the subject matter of bona vacantia." 
ENEVER, BONA VACANTIA 13 (1927). Contra, Ely, supra note 14, at 331-33. 
17 7 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 495-96 (2d ed. 1937); see generally, 
ENEVER, BONA VACANTIA (1927). 
1810 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 350 (1938); ENEVER, BONA VACANTIA 
65-74 (1927). 
19 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •299. 
20 ENEVER, BONA VACANTIA 45 (1927). 
21 Garrison, supra note 14, at 304; cf. Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458, 
469 (1905). 
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Whatever its origin or rationale, the power to escheat aban-
doned property is unquestioned.22 Two general classes of statutes 
providing for the transfer of title or possession to abandoned 
property have been enacted in this country. In one class, title to 
the property is transferred to the state;23 in the other, only posses-
sion is transferred.24 When it is found desirable to differentiate 
the two, the first is usually called an "escheat" statute; the second, 
a "custodial"25 one. In both classes, the passage of time without 
action of some sort by the owner raises a presumption that the 
property is "abandoned,"26 thereby bringing the property within 
the provisions of the statute. Minimal provisions for notice to the 
owner are usually incorporated in the statutes.27 Within a specified 
period, title or possession to the property is transferred to the state 
by administrative or judicial proceedings and the property is sold 
at public auction.28 In the custodial statute, the owner is allowed 
to reclaim the proceeds of this sale by submitting proper proof of 
ownership.29 In escheat statutes, the property is declared aban-
doned and all rights of the owner are terminated.30 However, it 
is common for states with custodial statutes also to provide for 
escheat by termination of the mvner's rights to reclaim after a 
22 "'\Ve need not consider whether a state possesses inherent power for such legislation 
as to personalty as the successor to a prerogative of royal sovereignty. As a broad principle 
of jurisprudence rather than as a result of the evolution of legal rules, it is clear that a 
state, subject to constitutional limitations, may use its legislative power to dispose of 
property within its reach, belonging to unknown persons." Standard Oil Co. v. New 
Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 435-3,6 (1951). 
23 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:37-ll to 2A:37-44 (1952); KY. REv. STAT. §§ 393.010-
.990 (1960). 
24E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 567.1, .11-.76 (1948), §§ 567.201-.206 (Supp. 1956); N.Y. 
AnAND. PRoP. LAw §§ 300-1406. 
25 See McBride, supra note 2, at 1063-64, for a list of statutes classified in this manner. 
20 Very often the period is seven years - the common-law period for presumption of 
death. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 567.37 (1948); UNIFORM DISPOSmON OF UNCLAIMED 
PROPERTY ACT § 2 (b). But the period may be more or less depending upon whether the 
statute is of the escheat or custodial type. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:37-13 (1952) (14 
years-escheat); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:37-29 (1952) (5 years-custody). This suggests 
that the underlying rationale of escheat may be considered analogous to that of missing 
persons, see, e.g., Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458, 469 (1905), and that 
seven years' absence without tidings is the minimum period for this type of statute. But 
presumption of death is not essential to custodial-type statutes, and if the state is pro-
tecting property as conservator for benefit of the owner, a lesser period of time may be 
adequate. 
27 Posting notice on courthouse door held adequate. Anderson Nat'! Bank v. Luckett, 
321 U.S. 233 (1944); but cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 
(1950). See also, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 567.36 (1948); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:37-18 to 
2A:37-19 (1952); N.Y. AnAND. PROP. LAw §§ 302, 402, 601, 702, 1002, 1402. 
28E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 567.56-.61 (1948); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:37-21 (1952); 
N.Y. AnAND. PROP. LAw § 1403. 
20 MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 567.63-.65 (1948); N.Y. ABAND. PROP. LAw § 1406. 
ao N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:37-25 (1952) makes title in purchaser at sale absolute and makes 
no provision for suit by owner against state after 14-year escheat period and proceedings. 
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specified period of custody.31 In these states there will be very 
little practical difference between the two types as far as the own-
er's rights are concerned. 
With respect to the problem of multiple escheat, the courts have 
refused to distinguish between these two types of statutes.32 The 
important theoretical difference between the two types is that 
in a custodial statute, the owner's rights are not immediately 
terminated. And in a pure custodial type, such as the Uniform 
Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, they are never terminated. 
That act provides for perpetual custody and allows a claim by the 
owner at any time.33 This distinction raises very different ques-
tions of due process between the ovmer and the state. In the 
custodial statute there is no "taking"34 of property from the owner 
- the state is merely acting as "conservator" of an absent mmer's 
property.31' In an escheat statute there is a "taking," and it might 
be expected that much more stringent requirements would be 
placed upon the exercise of escheat in such cases.36 As far as the 
state is concerned there should be little practical difference in the 
end result under either type - the owner is not likely to return. 
But it has been held that the distinction between the two types is 
the concern of the owner and not the holder.37 Both types of 
statutes are treated in the same manner in the escheat proceeding 
between the holder and the state. It is said that if the state is 
entitled to payment, the holder's liability to the o,;mer is discharged 
under either type of statute; therefore the holder's sole interest in 
the controversy is jurisdictional.38 Since the courts have elected 
31 It seems to be merely a matter of terminology whether statutes of this type should 
be called custodial with later escheat or merely escheat types. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 
2A:37-ll to 2A:37-44 (1952) provides for escheat after 14 years but an alternative method 
provides for "protective custody" after 5 years and escheat after 14 years. N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2A:37-29 (1952). This illustrates the difficulty in classifying a statute as custodial or 
escheat, as well as the great differences in statutes of various states. There is no "typical'' 
statute of either type. 
82 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 437-38 (1951). 
83 UNIFORM DzsposmoN OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Ac::r § 19. 
84 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § I, provides in part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any 
person of .•• property, without due process of law .•.. " Cf. Cities Serv. Co. v. McGrath, 
342 U.S. 330, 335-36 (1952). 
85 Cf. Provident Institution for Savings v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660, 664 (1911); Anderson 
Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 241-42 (1944). 
86 Cf. Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, supra note 35, at 241-42; Garrison, supra note 
14, at 305, 310. 
87 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 438-39 (1951), citing Security Sav. 
Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923), and Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, supra note 35. 
88 Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 286 (1923): "It is no concern of the 
bank's whether the State receives the money merely as depository or takes it as an escheat." 
Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 242-43 (1944): "Since the bank is a debtor 
to its depositors, it can interpose no due process or contract clause objection to payment 
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to treat the two types of statutes the same, as far as the holder is 
concerned, the following discussion is facilitated by the use of the 
term "escheat" to refer to the transfer of title or possession under 
either type. 
II. THE JURISDICTIONAL BASES FOR EscHEAT OF ABANDONED 
INTANGIBLE PROPERTY 
The common-law theory of jurisdiction is based upon "power" 
in the physical sense of property or persons present within the 
territorial limits of a state.39 This concept is reinforced and given 
a distinctive effect in America through interpretation of our fed-
eral constitution. While at common law a judgment rendered 
without physical power over the property or persons sought to be 
bound was valid within the territorial limits of the state,40 under 
our Constitution such a judgment is invalid as a denial of due proc-
ess of law, even ·within the state rendering it.41 Analytically, it is 
necessary to distinguish between this form of constitutional in-
validity and another which arises from a failure to give adequate 
notice to parties adversely affected by a judgment. The rendition 
of a judgment without physical power over the property or per-
sons to be bound is commonly termed a violation of "substantive" 
due process,42 while a failure to give adequate notice is a violation 
of "procedural" due process.43 As will be seen, a failure to dis-
tinguish these requirements has caused needless confusion in the 
area of escheat. 
Pennoyer v. Nef/44 is the leading American case exemplifying 
the "power" theory of jurisdiction, and presents two propositions 
of the claimed deposits to the state .••. But if the statute is deficient in its provisions for 
notice and opportunity for hearing so that the depositors would not be bound by any 
proceedings taken under it, the bank would be entitled to raise the question whether its 
obligation to the depositors would be discharged by payment of the deposits to the state." 
39 "The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power •••. " Mr. Justice Holmes in 
McDonald v. Mabee 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). See generally GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 
§§ 67-79 (3d ed. 1949). But cf. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws pt. 1, § 25 at 78-80 
(1959); Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and 
Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956). 
40 GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 39, § 72. The only inquiry was whether the legis• 
lature had granted authority to the court. 
41 GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 39, § 76, at 186; STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 60-62 
(2d ed. 1951). 
42 For an excellent discussion of the distinctions, and of the confusion engendered by 
the failure of the courts to make them, see Perry, The Mullane Doctrine -A Reappraisal 
of Statutory Notice Requirements, in CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 32, 39-43 
(1952). 
43 This is often discussed under the heading of "notice." 
44 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
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of importance to the area of escheat. First, a "seizure" of property 
within the territorial boundaries of a state is essential to the 
validity of an in rem judgment.45 Second, substituted service is 
insufficient to support an in personam judgment against a non-
resident.46 Traditional theories require the classification of a 
judgment as in rem, quasi in rem, or in personam, according to the 
purported effect of the judgment.47 The jurisdictional facts neces-
sary to give a judgment this effect are similarly classified. An 
escheat proceeding is usually thought of as operating in rem48 
because it purports to affect interests in the property itself.40 
Our traditional theories of jurisdiction therefore require the 
"seizure" of something within the state.50 No difficulty is pre-
sented when only tangible property is sought to be escheated, for 
its seizure is an incontrovertible physical fact. But when the 
property escheated is intangible, any seizure is bound to be fic-
tional.51 Conceptually, the seizure is a demonstration of power in 
much the same way as is personal service of process in an in per-
sonam action. Seizure is also important in the sense that it shows 
something to be present within the territorial limits of the state. 
It is in this sense that the concept of situs for intangible property 
is important, for only when property is located within the state 
can power be demonstrated by seizure.52 To accommodate tradi-
tional theories, the courts have assigned a fictional situs to intang-
ibles which varies according to the particular purpose to be 
served.53 It has been said that "at the root of the selection is gen-
erally a common sense appraisal of the requirements of justice 
and convenience in particular conditions. . . . "54 Although it is 
difficult to generalize in the area of escheat, it may be stated as a 
first approximation that the situs of the intangible is where the 
45 See also GOODRICH, CONFLIGr OF LAws § 71, at 177 (3d ed. 1949). 
46 See also EHRENZWEIG, CoNFLicr OF LAws pt. 1, § Zl (1959), and cases cited. 
47 See REsTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note to Chapter I (1942). 
48Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 245 (1944); Security Sav. Bank v. 
California, 263 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1923). 
49 REsTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note to Chapter I (1942). 
50 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 439 (1951). 
51 "It is true that fiction plays a part in the jurisprudential concept of control over 
intangibles. There is no fiction, however, in the fact that choses in action, stock certificates 
and dividends held by the corporation, are property." Ibid. 
-02 Cf. Carpenter, Jurisdiction Over Debts for the Purpose of Administration, Garnish-
ment, and Taxation, 31 HARv. L. REv. 905, 906 (1918). 
-03 Sevemoe Sec. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 120, 123, 174 N.E. 
299, 300 (1931) EHRENZWEIG, CONFLicr OF LAws pt. 1, § 26, at 84 (1959). 
54 Mr. Justice Cardozo in Sevemoe Sec. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., supra 
note 53, at 123-24. 
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holdei-05 can be served with process. In essence, what the courts 
have done for the purpose of accommodating traditional jurisdic-
tional theories is to treat an intangible as if it were a tangible - a 
debt as if it were an automobile. 
This present theory of jurisdiction is a modification and exten-
sion of ideas contained in Harris v. Balk.56 In that case it was held 
that payment of a debt to a garnisher in Maryland was a defense 
to a subsequent action by the creditor against the garnishee, and 
that personal service upon the garnishee in Maryland was suf-
ficient to support a quasi in rem judgment of garnishment there.57 
Therefore full faith and credit required the North Carolina court 
to allow the garnishee to plead his payment under the Maryland 
judgment.58 
Professor Beale has condemned this decision as "absolutely 
opposed to the decisions of many of the best courts in this coun-
try. "50 The basis for his objection was that the Maryland court did 
not have jurisdiction quasi in rem because it did not have "con-
trol" over both the debtor and the creditor.60 Logically following 
the "power" theory of jurisdiction, he argued that jurisdiction 
meant control, and since the debt had no physical existence and 
subsisted only as a legal relationship between the debtor and the 
creditor, control over the debt could be obtained only by control 
over both the parties.61 In effect he argued that with respect to 
intangible property, jurisdiction quasi in rem could not be 
obtained without first obtaining in personam jurisdiction over 
both the parties. 
55 See note 8 supra for definition of "holder" and "owner" as used in this comment. 
56198 U.S. 215 (1905). 
57 The apparent theory of the court was that the garnisher was an agent of the 
garnishee's creditor. This theory was originally suggested in Roon, GARNISHMENT § 246 
(1896); it provides no answer to the jurisdictional question, for the agency must be by 
operation of law, and the court's jurisdiction to appoint the garnisher is not apparent. 
This fiction seems no more reasonable than that of merely assigning a situs for the pur-
poses of jurisdiction. 
liB A distinction must be made between allowing the garnishee to plead payment as a 
defense and holding the debt "discharged." In the former case the obligation is not 
terminated, but something like a set-off to the extent of payment to the garnisher exists. 
"Discharge" in the sense of termination of the obligation can occur only where the court 
has in personam jurisdiction over both the parties. While there may be little practical 
difference between the two, there is, as will be seen, a great theoretical difference in the 
area of escheaL 
liO Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction In Rem To Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 
HARV. L. REv. 107, 120 (1913). 
60 Id. at 120-21. 
61 Id. at 115-16. See also GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws § 71, at 179-83 (3d ed. 1949). 
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The courts have not followed Professor Beale's theory. Instead, 
they have continued to hold that the situs of a debt for the pur-
poses of garnishment is with the debtor, and that personal service 
upon the debtor is an attachment of the debt. 62 Situs of the prop-
erty within the territorial limits of the state is as essential to the 
validity of the in rem proceeding of escheat as it is to the quasi 
in rem proceedings of garnishment, and the same jurisdictional 
theory underlying Harris v. Balk furnishes the basis for jurisdiction 
in escheat today.63 If, as Professor Beale contended, coercive power 
is the true foundation of jurisdiction, his conclusions follow. It is 
therefore necessary to analyze the two theories to determine where 
they differ and why. 
The essential weakness in Professor Beale's theory is that it as-
sumes an essential connection between the standards of in rem 
jurisdiction and those of in personam jurisdiction. As stated by 
Professor Carpenter,64 his conclusion "is based upon the assump• 
tion that the debt cannot have a situs with debtor."65 In short, his 
major premise is that without physical existence there can be no 
existence for jurisdictional purposes. But there is no reason why 
the courts cannot treat the debt differently for the purposes of 
in rem proceedings than they do for the purpose of in personam 
proceedings. Nothing requires the court to deal with the in per-
sonam rights and duties between the parties themselves in an in 
rem action. In the case of tangible property attachments, only 
the in rem rights of the parties are affected; no one has ever 
thought in personam jurisdiction over both the parties was neces-
sary. 66 This is explained by Professor Carpenter in the following 
manner: 
"In the case of a debt, the relationship between the cred-
itor and the debtor has two aspects of significance for the law; 
one, the direct relationship between the creditor and the 
debtor, i.e., the right in personam which the creditor has 
against the debtor, and the correlative duty of the debtor to 
the creditor, and the other, its relationship to third persons, 
i.e., to the world. In this latter aspect, the law has come to 
62 See STOMBERG, CoNFUcr OF LAws 107-09 (2d ed. 1951). 
63 The distinction between quasi in rem and in rem judgments is merely in the 
range of persons affected. The jurisdictional theory of escheat will be fully developed infra. 
64 Carpenter, Jurisdiction Over Debts for the Purpose of Administration, Garnishment, 
and Taxation, 31 HARV. L. REv. 905 (1918). This article was written in reply to Professor 
Beale's article, supra note 59. 
65 Id. at 911. (Emphasis added.) 
66 See Carpenter, supra note 64, at 912-13. 
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treat this right of the creditor as it relates to third persons as a 
property right. The debt is an asset of the creditor, in the same 
way in which any tangible property he owns is an asset."67 
Simply stated, this is but to say that a court can treat a debt as 
property if it ·wishes, and no violence ·will be done to the traditional 
power theory of jurisdiction since the judgment affects only the 
in rem rights of the creditor in the intangible and not the in per-
sonam rights he has against the debtor. Putting the matter crudely, 
but perhaps most accurately, since the state could imprison the 
debtor to prevent payment to the creditor, it exercises and pos-
sesses as much control over the debt as it does over a chattel seizure 
or levy.08 
This is not a complete answer to Professor Beale's arguments, 
however. It is simply a refusal to accept his syllogism's major 
premise that if physical power is accepted as the basis of juris-
diction, then it is impossible to reconcile the use of a fictional ob-
ject, or, stated another way, that physical power cannot operate 
upon an imaginary object. Conceptually, the distinction is illus-
trated by Professor Chafee's matchless allegory: 
"This attempt to divide a debt into two independent parts 
recalls the story of the two men who bought a cow, one own-
ing the front portion, and the other the rear, until the front 
mvner, wearying of supplying food while the other got all the 
milk, decided to kill his half, 'and Bill's half died too, it did.' 
Any judicial action upon the debtor's obligation must neces-
sarily affect the creditor's right, and therefore he is a necessary 
party to the suit.''69 
The difference between the views of the courts following the doc-
trines of Harris v. Balk, on the one hand, and of Professor Beale, 
on the other, seems to be as simple as that. The courts simply 
will not carry the logic of physical power as far as will Professor 
Beale. 
With this background of competing jurisdictional concepts it 
is possible to trace the development of the present jurisdictional 
67 Carpenter, supra note 64, at 912. Cf. HoHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 
68-114 (1923); STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 115-34 (1950). 
68 This illustration also shows the weakness of Carpenter's argument. An injunc-
tion against the garnishee preventing payment is of course equivalent to imprisonment in 
this analogy. But it must be noted that the only thing making control over the debt by 
service upon the garnishee equivalent to control over a tangible is the full faith and 
credit clause, for otherwise another gamisher could garnish a corporate garnishee in 
another state. 
69 Chafee, Interstate lnterpleader, 33 YALE L.J. 685, 709 (1924). 
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theory in the area of escheat of abandoned intangible property. 
In Security Sav. Bank v. California,70 the Supreme Court was 
forced to consider the jurisdictional theory of escheat for the first 
time. 71 In this case, deposits72 in a California bank were sought 
to be escheated to the state pursuant to a California "abandoned 
property" statute.73 The Court held that since the debts arose out 
of contracts made and to be performed in California they were 
property within the state and service of process upon the bank was 
a seizure of that debt. The only authority cited for the proposi-
tion that the debts were property within the state was Professor 
Carpenter's article.74 This article, as before noted,75 was ·written as 
a rebuttal of Professor Beale's objections to Harris v. Balk and as 
a justification and explanation of the jurisdictional theories it em-
bodied. In the next Supreme Court escheat case, Anderson Nat'l 
Bank v. Luckett,16 unclaimed bank deposits were again held to be 
properly subject to escheat.77 The Supreme Court was again faced 
with the problem of jurisdictional theory in Connecticut Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Moore.78 There, the state of New York sought to escheat 
the proceeds of unclaimed insurance policies issued in New York on 
the lives of New York residents, payable to New York benefi-
ciaries.79 The difficulty arose because the insurance companies 
were not incorporated in New York, but were merely doing busi-
ness in that state. Using language which has apparently caused some 
10 263 U.S. 282 (1923). 
71 Provident Institution for Savings v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660 (1911), was the first case 
before the Supreme Court involving escheat of intangible property. However, the juris-
dictional issue was not presented in the opinion. Only the power of the state to escheat 
appeared to be in issue. In Security S(W. Bank the Court was squarely faced with the 
issue of jurisdiction. 
72 It does not appear from the record whether any of the depositors were nonresidents. 
Consequently, while the point was argued the Court made no specific holding concerning 
residence. Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 284, 290 (1923). 
73 This proceeding was under a custodial-type statute, later repealed upon adoption 
of the Uniform Act in 1959. 
74 Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 285 n.3 (1923). 
75 Note 64 supra. 
76 321 U.S. 233 (1944). Although United States v. Klein, 303 U.S. 276 (1938), was 
decided before Anderson Nat'l Bank and involved escheat, its holding was limited to the 
constitutionality of Pennsylvania's escheat of funds in possession of federal court, and did 
not directly involve the jurisdictional issues relevant to the problem of multiple escheat. 
77 The proceeding here was under the Kentucky escheat-type statute, but suit was 
brought before the determination of abandonment and therefore that the state was 
acting in capacity of conservator. The Court refused to distinguish the California statute 
from the Kentucky statute, with the result that the opinion is essentially a reaffirmation 
of Security Sav. Bank. Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, supra note 76, at 242. It did not 
appear whether any of the depositors were nonresidents. 
78 333 U.S. 541 (1948). 
79 Id. at 550. 
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confusion, the Court said, "The question is whether the State of 
New York has sufficient contacts with the transactions here in 
question to justify the exertion of the power to seize abandoned 
moneys due to its residents."80 This is nothing more than an ap-
plication of the test of International Shoe Co. v. W ashington81 
for determining whether personal service of process may be made 
on a foreign corporation doing business within the state.82 How-
ever, the holding was precisely limited to the case where the pol-
icies were issued for delivery in New York, on the lives of New 
York residents, and payable to New York beneficiaries, with the 
caveat that the insured continue his residence and that the benefi-
ciary be a resident at the maturity of the policy.88 The most recent 
Supreme Court case developing the jurisdictional theory of escheat 
is Standard Oil Co. v. New ]ersey.84 But prior to an examination 
of this case it is desirable to summarize the developments which 
preceded it, in order that its effects may be more fully appreciated. 
Security Sav. Bank and Anderson Nat'l Bank both held that 
the state of incorporation might escheat unclaimed bank deposits. 
Connecticut Mutual held that a state other than that of incorpora-
tion might also escheat insurance proceeds if that state had suffi-
cient "contacts" with the transaction to meet the test of Interna-
tional Shoe. Connecticut Mutual was strictly limited to the case 
where both the insured and the beneficiary were residents of the 
state seeking to escheat. Although it was argued in Security Sav. 
Bank that nonresident depositors would not be bound by the 
escheat, 85 the record does not show that any were, in fact, 86 non-
residents, and the court did not consider their rights.87 Since this 
so Id. at 548. 
81 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
82 See generally, GOODRICH, CoNFL1cr OF LAws § 76 (3d ed. 1949). 
83 This was the posture in which the case was presented by the lower court, 187 Misc. 
1004, 65 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd mem., 271 App. Div 1002, 69 N.Y.S. 2d 323, 
aff'd, 297 N.Y. 1, 74 N.E.2d 24: (1947), aff'd, 333 U.S. 541 (1948). It should be noted that 
the reason the courts of New York so limited their decision was to alleviate the possibility 
of multiple escheat. However, the United States Supreme Court added the caveat that the 
residence of the parties continue to be in New York. 
84 341 U.S. 428 (1951). 
85 Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 286 (1923). 
86 263 U.S. at 284, 290. See note 72 supra. 
87 Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 290 (1923). The difficulty with this 
interpretation is that the Court summarizes the bank's argument as to nonresident de• 
positors, 263 U.S. at 286, and then proceeds in its opinion as if it had answered these 
arguments by saying the proceeding is quasi in rem as to depositors. Since the state court 
reserved the question of the rights of depositors the most reasonable interpretation seems 
to be that the Supreme Court did not consider their status. 
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was apparently true in Anderson Bank as well,88 it might be force-
fully argued that the only state with jurisdiction to escheat in-
tangible property is that of the last known domicile of the mrner 
of that intangible, provided personal service can be had upon the 
holder. This argument is considerably strengthened by the ref-
erence to "discharge"89 of the obligation by payment to the state 
pursuant to the escheat statute. Since the debt could be discharged 
only in the sense of termination of liability to the mrner if the 
court had in personam jurisdiction over both the parties, and 
since the above interpretation does provide this jurisdiction, it may 
be argued that this was the jurisdictional theory of Connecticut 
Mutual. 
In Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey,90 the majority of the 
Supreme Court held that New Jersey, the state of incorporation of 
the holder, could escheat the unclaimed stock and dividends of 
shareholders whose last kno,rn addresses were outside of New 
Jersey.91 The corporation had no property in New Jersey except 
its stock and transfer books.92 Speaking for the majority, Mr. Jus-
tice Reed held that: 
"It was not solely the fact that the contracts for bank de-
posits were made in California and Kentucky that gave those 
states power over the abandoned deposits. . . . The controlling 
fact was that the banks and the depositors could be served with 
process, either personally or by publication, to determine 
rights in this chose in action."93 
This decision rests squarely on the jurisdictional theory embodied 
in Harris v. Balk. No question of "contacts" is raised, for it has 
always been held that the state of incorporation has in personam 
jurisdiction over its domestic corporations.94 The last knmrn resi-
dence of the owner of the intangible property is immaterial under 
this decision. The sole issue is whether the corporate holder may 
be personally served with process - the same test as that employed 
in Harris v. Balk. 
Regardless of the argument that a different theory was used 
prior to the decision in Standard Oil, these decisions can all be 
88 See note 77 supra. 
89 Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 286 (1923). See also Anderson Nat'l 
Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 242 (1944). 
00 341 U.S. 428 (1951). 
91 See id. at 437 n.8 as to residence of owners. 
92 Id. at 437. 
93 Id. at 437-38. 
94 GoODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws § 75 (3d ed. 1949). 
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easily and simply reconciled. Since it is now apparent that the 
only issue is whether personal service of process upon the holder 
can be made, and the only time this argument could be raised is 
in a case like Connecticut JJ.!utual where the holder is incorporated 
in another state, the absence of discussion on this point is under-
standable. Only in a state other than that of incorporation is the 
issue of "contacts" with the transaction giving rise to the intangible 
relevant.95 Further, in all the cases prior to Standard Oil, "dis-
charge" of the obligation between mvner and holder was possible 
since the court had in personam jurisdiction over both the parties96 
- service upon the absent resident owner by publication and per-
sonal service upon the holder. "Discharge" of the obligation, how-
ever, is not possible in a case like Standard Oil because the court 
cannot obtain in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident owner 
by constructive service. It is this distinction between the Standard 
0 il case and those prior to it which has raised the serious problem 
of multiple escheat of intangibles.97 
Unfortunately, the majority of the Court in Standard Oil con-
fused the distinction between the jurisdictional theory of Harris 
v. Balk and that of Professor Beale. This is illustrated by their 
statement, "Whatever may be Professor Beale's view of garnish-
ment, he agrees ·with the theory of control relied upon herein."98 
It is more likely, however, that Professor Beale would dissent 
from any decision allowing in rem proceedings against intangible 
property without first gaining in personam jurisdiction over both 
the parties to the obligation. The majority then goes on to say 
that the "rights of the owners of the stock and dividends come 
within the reach of the court by notice, i.e., service by publica-
tion .... "00 In view of the decision of this same Court in Estin v. 
Estin,1°0 just three years earlier, it seems clear that they do not 
mean to say that service by publication upon a nonresident can 
05 This assumes that the test of International Shoe does not apply to service of process 
upon individuals, and the transitory presence within the state is sufficient to found in 
personam jurisdiction over individuals as distinguished from corporations. But cf. EHREN-
ZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws pt. 1, § 30 (1959). 
06 But cf. Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923). 
07 Cf. McBride, Unclaimed Dividends, Escheat Statutes and the Corporation Lawyer, 14 
Bus. LAw. 1062, 1068-71 (1959); Colby, The 1954 Uniform and Model Acts: A Summary 
and Analysis, 41 A.B.A.J. 39 (1955); NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CoMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM 
STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK 136-37 (1954). 
OB Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 438 n.9 (1951). 
oo Id. at 440. 
100 334 U.S. 541 (1948). "But we are aware of no power which the State of domicile 
of the debtor has to determine the personal rights of the creditor in the intangible unless 
the creditor has been personally served or appears in the proceeding. The existence of 
any such power has been repeatedly denied." ld. at 548 .. 
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furnish the basis for an in personam judgment against him.101 
The most reasonable interpretation of this opinion would appear 
to be that, for the purposes of an in rem or quasi in rem judgment, 
"substantive" due process is satisfied by personal service of process 
upon the holder of abandoned intangibles, and that "procedural" 
due process is satisfied by service by publication on the nonresi-
dent owner. The majority appears to have misunderstood Pro-
fessor Beale's theory of power as the basis of jurisdiction. Properly 
viewed, the escheat cases merely represent an application of Harris 
v. Balk) involving reification of a "right" as a "thing." 
But the distinctions between Professor Beale's theory and the 
present judicial theory of jurisdiction are important, for they bear 
directly upon the effectiveness of full faith and credit as a bar to 
multiple escheat and to current attempts to solve the problem of 
multiple escheat of intangible property. 
III. FuLL FAITH AND CREDIT AS A BAR To MuLTIPLE EscHEAT 
In Standard Oil) the majority of the Supreme Court stated 
that the full faith and credit clause would be a bar to multiple 
escheat.102 As a theoretical matter, they are clearly correct. Al-
though there may be potentially more than one situs for an in-
tangible because more than one state may have sufficient con-
tacts to justify personal service upon a corporate holder,103 once 
process has issued against the holder there has been a seizure of 
the property, and, after entry of judgment,104 a conclusive determi-
nation of situs. Since seizure of property with a situs within the 
territorial boundaries of the state is essential to jurisdiction,105 
the second state cannot thereafter seize the same intangible with-
101But cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); EHRENZWEIG, 
CoNFLicr OF LAws pt. I,§ 28 (1959); Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer Is Dead-Long Live Pennoyer, 
30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 285 (1958). 
102 341 u .s. at 443. 
103 "There are several states with possible claims to the escheat of intangibles. The 
state of incorporation of the obligor; the state where the last known owner was domi-
ciled ... the state where later on the true residence of the owner was proved to be; the 
state of his last known domicile; the state where the obligor has its main place of business; 
in case of insurance or trust property, the state of residence (or domicile) of the bene-
ficiary." Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 445 (1951) (dissenting opinion). 
104 It is difficult to determine whether the seizure, i.e., service of process upon the 
holder, or the entry of judgment is the critical fact. The issue will arise when a second 
state begins an escheat proceeding while such a proceeding is pending in another state 
and the second state renders judgment first. For an analogous situation in garnishment, 
see Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 (1934); 2 SHINN, ATIACHMENT AND 
GARNISHMENT § 721 (1896). 
105 REsTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 5, 32, comment b (1942). 
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out denying the full faith and credit to the prior judgment.106 
Because of this, the first state to adjudicate the issue of situs is 
the only state with jurisdiction for the purposes of escheat. The 
result is a race of diligence among the competing states.107 
A difficulty, however, arises, for unless the first state had juris-
diction, its adjudication of the situs issue is not entitled to full 
faith and credit. Under present theories of escheat, the holder 
is viewed as a mere stakeholder108 in an in rem proceeding to de-
termine title to property in his possession. The effect is to magnify 
jurisdictional defects, for they can neither be waived nor cured,1°9 
and full faith and credit does not preclude collateral attack upon 
the first judgment for any minute jurisdictional error.11° In the 
event such error is found, the second state may escheat the same 
intangible and the holder is left to whatever remedies he may have 
against the first state. Fortunately, no case of multiple escheat has 
yet been reported,111 but if the unfortunate experience of gar-
nishees under this same theory112 is any indication of what may 
be expected, it is only a question of time before such a case will 
be before the Supreme Court.113 
100 For the purposes of this comment it will be assumed that full faith and credit is 
required for administrative determinations as well as strictly judicial determinations. See 
Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944). 
107 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 444 (1951) (dissenting opinion). 
108 Cf. Provident Institution for Savings v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660 (1911); Security Sav. 
Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 285 (1923); Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 
233, 242 (1944); see also Chafee, Interstate Interpleader, 33 YALE L.J. 685, 711 (1924); 2 
SHINN, op. cit. supra note 104, § 471, at 838. 
100 Cf. Note, "Double Liability" of Garnishees Resulting From Failure of Jurisdiction, 
48 YALE L.J. 690 (1939). 
110 For illustrations of errors attacked in garnishment cases, see Notes, 29 MICH. L. REv. 
114 (1930) and 40 YALE L.J. 139 (1930). See generally RooD, GARNISHMENT §§ 202-20 
(1896); 2 SHINN, op. cit. supra note 104, §§ 707-27. See also Boskey & Braucher, Jurisdic-
tion and Collateral Attack: October Term, 1939, 40 CoLUM. L. REv. 1006 (1940); Farrier, 
Full Faith and Credit of Adjudication of Jurisdictional Facts, 2 U. CHI L. REv. 552 (1935); 
Moore & Oglebay, The Supreme Court and Full Faith and Credit, 29 VA. L. REv. 557 
(1943); Rashid, The Full Faith and Credit Clause: Collateral Attack of Jurisdictional 
Issues, 36 GEo. L.J. 154 (1948); Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to 
Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 153 (1949). 
111 The closest approach has been Commonwealth v. Western Union Tel. Co., 73 
Dauph. 160, 173 (Pa. C.P. 1958), where the court said, "It is set forth that $725.85 has 
already been escheated to New York and payment of that amount has been made. We 
take this opportunity of saying that we do not recognize New· York's authority to escheat 
that money, but since it has been done we have no jurisdiction over this sum." 
112 See authorities cited in note 110 supra. 
113 The case is most likely to arise when the first state to escheat is the domicile of 
the owner and the second state is tbe state of incorporation of the holder. Cf. State v. 
American Sugar Ref. Co., 20 N.J. 286, 119 A.2d 767 (1956). 
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The reasons for the danger of multiple escheat are found in 
the doctrines of collateral attack114 of judgments and in the fact 
that in personam jurisdiction over both the owner and the holder 
are not required by the present theory. Congressional imple-
mentation of the full faith and credit clause requires that judicial 
proceedings shall have the same effect in other states "as they have 
by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession 
from which they are taken. "115 This means not only that the 
judgment must be enforced, but also that the doctrines of collateral 
attack and res judicata relating to the effect of that judgment 
must also be given full faith and credit.116 In analyzing the effect 
of a judgment it is necessary to distinguish between collateral at-
tack and res judicata doctrines. Res judicata117 relates to the 
effect of a judgment between parties and those in privity with 
them. Collateral attack doctrines118 relate to the issue whether 
a judgment may be incidentally attacked in a second action for 
want of jurisdiction by anyone, whether or not he is a party or 
privy. To the extent that doctrines of res judicata prevent reliti-
gation of the jurisdictional issue it may be considered as included 
within the broader category of doctrines of collateral attack.11° 
The general rule is that a judgment rendered without jurisdiction 
over the parties in an in personam proceeding or without juris-
diction over the res in an in rem proceeding is wholly void120 
and subject to collateral attack at any time.121 But this rule is 
sharply limited where parties and those in privity with them at-
tempt to attack the judgment. Here, res judicata is held to preclude 
collateral attack by this class of persons where the issue of juris-
diction was actually litigated,122 or could have been litigated,123 
in the first action. Since these persons have had their day in court, 
114 See generally 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §§ 304-400 (5th ed. 1925); R.EsrATEMENT, 
JUDGMENTS §§ 11-13 (1942). 
115 28 u.s.c. § 1738 (1958). 
116 See Rashid, supra note 110. 
117 See generally R.EsrATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 41-76 (1942). 
118 See 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 305 (5th ed. 1925). 
119 There is a great deal of unnecessary confusion in the terminology in this area. 
Some authors prefer to use the term "res judicata" to refer only to the effects of a valid 
judgment. 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 304 (5th ed. 1925). The Restatement usage seems 
preferable, and it will be used in this comment. 
120 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 325 (5th ed. 1925). 
121 R.EsrATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 11 (1942). See R.EsrATEMENT, CoNFLicr OF LAws 
§§ 429-51 (1934). 
122 R.EsrATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 9, 10 (1942); R.EsrATEMENT, CONFLicr OF LAws § 451 
(1934). 
123 See Boskey & Braucher, supra note 110. Cf. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter 
State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940). 
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the salutary policy of putting an end to litigation overrides the 
possibility of injustice resulting from a lack of jurisdiction.124 
This limitation is not imposed upon strangers125 to the first action, 
however, and, if they have an interest or right adversely affected 
by the judgment,126 they may attack it for any jurisdictional defect. 
With this general examination of the doctrines of collateral 
attack it is now possible to consider their application and effect 
upon the two theories. 
A. Effect Under Present Jurisdictional Theory 
At least two distinct factual situations have arisen under the 
present jurisdictional theory of escheat. The first situation is 
illustrated by the Standard Oil case, where the proceeding was in-
stituted in the holder's state of incorporation but the owner was 
a nonresident. The second situation is illustrated by the Con-
necticut Mutual case, where the proceeding was instituted in the 
state of the mrner's last kno,rn domicile and the holder was a 
foreign corporation which was personally served with process. The 
theoretical distinction between the two situations arises from the 
fact that the requirements of both in rem and in personam juris-
diction are satisfied in the Connecticut Mutual situation and only 
the in rem requirements are met in the Standard Oil situation. 
Where in personam jurisdiction over the owner is not acquired, 
as in Standard Oil, the judgment can operate only in rem. Con-
sequently, the mrner's in personam rights against the holder are 
not affected, and since the mrner was not a party or privy to the 
first proceeding, he may collaterally attack it for jurisdictional 
defects. However, with respect to the o,rner's in personam rights 
against the holder on the original obligation there are two impor-
tant limitations. First, a statute of limitations may have run 
against the mrner as to this obligation. Second, as in the case of 
garnishment,127 the holder may plead his payment to the state as a 
defense. But, if this payment was not made pursuant to a valid 
court order, that is, if the court did not have jurisdiction to issue 
such an order, then this payment is not a defense in the action by 
the mrner.128 In view of the efficacy of the statute of limitations 
against the o"t\Tller, whether it be construed to extinguish either the 
1241 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 305 (5th ed. 1925). 
125 Id. §§ 317-18. 
126Id. § 319. 
127 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). 
128 Roon, GARNISHMENT §§ 213, 271 (1896). 
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"right" or the "remedy,"129 and the unlikelihood of the owner ever 
appearing, it would seem that the possibility of the holder's 
liability to the owner after escheat is very small. 
Unfortunately, these same considerations do not apply when a 
second state attempts to escheat the same intangible property. 
Because it is neither party nor privy to the first proceeding, it may 
collaterally attack the first judgment for any jurisdictional defect. 
It is clearly not bound by a statute of limitation in the first state 
which is characterized as extinguishing the remedy of the mmer.130 
A difficult and unanswered question remains if this limitation 
extinguishes the right.131 This question is intimately related to the 
issues presented when in personam jurisdiction is obtained over 
the owner in the first proceeding, and will be discussed in that 
context.132 With this reservation, it seems clear that if the second 
state can find a jurisdictional defect in the first proceeding it 
may require the holder to pay again. The holder will be left to 
whatever remedies he may have in the first state, and in this he may 
be considerably hampered by the fact that doctrines of res judicata133 
apply between himself and the first state. If the jurisdictional 
defects were caused by the holder's mm inadvertence he may have 
no remedy at all. 
This unfortunate state of affairs must be compared to a situa-
tion where, as in Connecticut Mutual, the court does have juris-
diction for an in personam judgment against the mmer as well as 
the holder.134 In this factual situation the escheat proceeding is 
akin to a default judgment against the owner,135 but with the im-
portant distinction that the default occurs in an in personam pro-
ceeding. An important conceptual difference arises from the fact 
that the court has jurisdiction over both the parties; the original 
debt or other obligation between the owner and the holder is ex-
129 This distinction corresponds to that of the REsTATEMENT, CoNFLicr OF LAWS 
§ 603 (statute of limitations of forum), and § 605 (time limitations on cause of action) 
(1934). 
130 See RllsTATEMENT, CoNFLicr OF LAws § 603 (1934). 
131 See Ely, Escheats: Perils and Precautions, 15 Bus. LAW. 791, 795-97 (1960). 
132 See text accompanying notes 134-42 infra. 
133 Since the holder was a party to the first proceeding and could have directly 
attacked the judgment it is difficult to see how he could avoid the res judicata effect of 
his appearance. Unless the holder could obtain equitable relief for mistake, 1 FREEMAN, 
JUDGMENTS § 308 (5th ed. 1925), it would appear he must rely upon provisions for reim-
bursement in the escheat statute of the first state. 
134 See note 83 supra and accompanying text. 
135 This is by hypothesis true in all escheat proceedings. For a discussion of the 
effect on collateral attack doctrines generally, see 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 662 (5th ed. 
1925). 
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tinguished.138 This must be carefully distinguished from the case 
previously discussed where the court does not have in personam 
jurisdiction over both parties. Because a debt subsists only as a 
legal relation between the parties,137 it has no existence for any 
purpose without the existence of such a relationship. So long 
as this relation exists, it is possible to argue that the debt has a 
-situs in one state rather than in another. The only issue is in which 
state is the legal situs for the purposes of escheat. But this neces-
-sarily assumes the existence of the debt or some other obligation. 
If the intangible does not exist, if it has been destroyed by ex-
tinguishing the obligation, no state can escheat. Thus in the state 
-court opinion138 in the Standard Oil case, the New Jersey court held 
that since the New Jersey statute of limitations extinguished the 
rights and not merely the remedies of some of the owners of the 
-claims sought to be escheated, even the state of New Jersey was 
barred with regard to these, for the obligation or res no longer 
existed to be escheated.139 Similarly, in State v. Sperry & Hutchin-
son Co.,140 escheat of unclaimed "Green Stamps" was denied on 
-grounds that the state had "proved no rights to which it may suc-
ceed."141 The court held that the accumulation by one person 
-0f 1200 stamps in a book was the condition upon which the obliga-
tion to pay arose, and since the state had not shmvn that this con-
dition was met there was no showing that there ever had been an 
obligation.142 It would also seem clear that the holder may prove 
payment or other discharge of an obligation and avoid payment in 
that manner. Each of these illustrations points to the importance 
of in personam jurisdiction in destroying the intangible property 
itself. If the holder is faced with a second escheat proceeding after 
such an in personam discharge, the second state should be required 
to first show that the obligation still exists before the question 
-0£ situs is even reached. Inquiry must therefore be directed toward 
the issue of whether the in personam rights of the owner against 
the holder have been terminated by the first proceeding. U nfor-
tunately for the holder, it would appear that application of the doc-
136 This is to be distinguished from the ambiguous term "discharge" so often used 
by the courts in both garnishment and escheat cases to mean merely that the courts will 
not compel a man to pay his debts twice. See note 58 supra. 
137 Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 548 (1948); see also Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction 
In Rem To Compel Payment of a Debt, Z7 HARV. L. REv. 107, 115-16 (1913). 
138 State v. Standard Oil Co., 5 N.J. 281, 74 A.2d 565 (1950). 
130 Id. at 292-98, 74 A.2d at 570-73. 
140 56 N.J. Super. 589, 153 A.2d 691 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959). 
141 Id. at 596, 603-04, 153 A.2d at 695, 698-99. 
142 See Ely, supra note 131, at 803-05. 
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trines of collateral attack to an in personam judgment allows no 
greater protection against multiple escheat than if the judgment 
was merely in rem. 
Only where the first state is the domicile of the owner can 
constructive service be sufficient to support an in personam judg-
ment affecting the owner's rights.143 It seems clear, then, that if 
the second state can prove that the mrner's domicile was not in 
the first state, the judgment of escheat can operate only in rem. 
The second state should also be free to attack the in personam 
proceedings for any other jurisdictional defect which infects the 
validity of the in personam judgment. Improper service upon 
the holder144 or failure to comply with the constructive service 
statute145 will prevent the court from acquiring in personam juris-
diction and extinguishing the obligation. Once such a defect is 
found, a second state might be able to compel payment from the 
holder a second time. Defects in the acquisition of in personam 
jurisdiction should be no more difficult to find than defects in in rem 
jurisdiction, and it is therefore likely that the danger of multiple 
escheat is essentially the same, whether the facts are similar to those 
of Connecticut Mutual or to those of Standard Oil. Thus under 
present jurisdictional theories of escheat, the theoretical distinc-
tion between in personam jurisdiction over both the parties and in 
rem jurisdiction over the intangible has no significant practical 
effect in preventing multiple escheat. 
B. Effect Under Professor Beale's Theory of Jurisdiction 
The essential difference between Professor Beale's theory of 
jurisdiction over intangibles and the present theories lies in the fact 
that Professor Beale would require in personam jurisdiction over 
both the parties. While in personam jurisdiction over the parties 
may result under present jurisdictional theories, as in Connecticut 
Mutual, it is not essential. Since escheat can occur only when the 
owner does not appear, the only state ·with jurisdiction to escheat 
under Professor Beale's theory is the state of the mrner's domicile. 
The result is that the only way the second state may attack the first 
143 REsrATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 16, comments a, b (1942). 
144 Cf. 2 SHINN, A'ITACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT §§ 471, 472, 680 (1896); ROOD, GAR• 
NISHMENT § 271 (1896). 
145 For types of jurisdictional defects which make judgment void and subject to col-
lateral attack, see RooD, GARNISHMENT§§ 202-20 (1896); 2 SHINN, op. cit. supra note 144, at 
§§ 707-27; REsrATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 8, comment b (1942). But cf. Moore &: Oglebay, 
supra note 110, at 572. 
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proceedings is by showing that it is the domicile of the owner. The 
almost overwhelming practical difficulties of proving domicile in 
the setting of escheat, where the owners have not been heard from 
for many years, would seem to make proof of domicile by the sec-
ond state improbable. Since the attacking party, and not the holder, 
has the burden of proof,146 it would seem that as a practical matter 
the danger of multiple escheat is strikingly limited under Professor 
Beale's theory of jurisdiction. Collateral attack is permitted only 
where the attacking party has an interest adversely affected by the 
prior judgment, and under Professor Beale's theory, only the state 
of owner's domicile could have such an interest.147 In view of the 
great difference in the dangers of multiple escheat which flow from 
a theory such as that of Standard Oil and Connecticut Mutual on 
the one hand, and that of Professor Beale, on the other, it is im-
portant to see what reasons may have impelled the choice. Al-
though any inquiry into the practical reasoning of the Court is 
bound to be speculative, Mr. Justice Cardozo's advice that situs 
is the result of a "common sense appraisal of the requirements of 
justice and convenience in particular conditions"148 bids us at least 
inquire. 
First, there is a distinct possibility that no state may be able to 
escheat under Professor Beale's strict power theory of jurisdiction. 
In some cases there will be no way of determining domicile at all, 
since the owner may have no known address.149 While the courts 
may have to make the best of what they have, mere knowledge of 
the owner's address many years ago may seem unsatisfactory for the 
purposes of establishing in personam jurisdiction.150 In any case, 
the only basis for the determination of domicile will be a pre-
sumption that one established years ago continues until evidence 
of a new domicile is presented.151 Even if domicile is adequately 
established, the state may not be able to get in personam juris-
146 Cf. State v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 20 N.J. 286, 119 A.2d 767 (1956); 1 FREEMAN, 
JUDGMENTS §§ 373-92 (5th ed. 1925). 
H7 See 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 319 (5th ed. 1925). This is so because under Beale's 
theory only the state of owner's domicile can obtain jurisdiction and unless the second 
state has jurisdiction to escheat it has been deprived of nothing by the prior judgment. 
HS Sevemoe Sec. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 120, 123-24, 174 
N.E. 299, 300 (1931). 
HO In this case the court would either have to assume a domicile or not allow escheat. 
150 Cf. State v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 20 N.J. 286, 295, 119 A.2d 767, 772 (1956). 
And see 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 385 (5th ed. 1925), c.onceming presumptions on con-
structive service when subjected to collateral attack. 
151 "A domicil once established c.ontinues until it is superseded by a new domicil." 
RFsrATEMENT, CONFLicr OF LAws § 23 (1934). 
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diction over the holder.152 Or the domiciliary state may not have 
an escheat statute;153 or even if the state has an escheat statute and 
can personally serve the parties, the holder may have no assets with-
in the state. The difficulty of enforcing payment from assets held 
in other states154 may create serious doubt concerning the efficacy 
of such escheat. Since the general attitude toward escheat is one of 
preventing a windfall to the holder and of applying abandoned 
property to the benefit of all rather than the chance enrichment of 
the "lucky" holder, the importance of these considerations cannot 
be overemphasized.155 
Second, if the relative merits of the claims of competing states 
are considered,156 it is possible to conclude that the state of last 
known residence or domicile of the O"Wner has the least meritorious 
claim.157 The greater part of the corporate business that produced 
the wealth embodied in the intangible may have been carried on 
in, and under the protection laws of the laws of, another state. In 
its effect, escheat of abandoned property has the same revenue-pro-
ducing capability as taxation.158 With this prima facie resem-
blance, an analogy from taxation to escheat is not difficult to 
draw.159 Jurisdiction for the purposes of taxation is based upon a 
rationale of "benefits conferred."160 Perhaps this colored the 
Court's thinking. 
152 While this possibility is decreased if the holder is an interstate corporation, the 
vague standards of International Shoe and Connecticut Mutual would appear to limit 
severely the number of states in which the holder could be served. 
153 At present only 18 states have statutes escheating intangibles. See states listed in 
note 6 supra. 
154 If the escheat proceeding is held to result in a judgment for the payment of money 
to the state no difficulty should be encountered. See Milwaukee County v. M. E. White 
Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935). But if the escheat proceeding results in an order to turn over 
the intangible to the state, it seems somewhat anomalous to need to enforce that judgment 
in another state since the first state ostensibly decided that the "situs" of the intangible 
was within its territory. 
155 "Such property thus escapes seizure by would-be possessors and is used for the 
general good rather than for the chance enrichment of particular individuals or organiza-
tions." Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 436 (1951); NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK 137 (1954). 
156 See Note, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1408, 1413-19 (1952), for evaluation of claims. 
157 State v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 20 N.J. 286, 119 A.2d 767 (1956). 
158 See McBride, Unclaimed Dividends, Escheat Statutes and the Corporation Lawyer, 
14 Bus. LAw. 1062, 1065-68 (1959), for a recent analysis of the revenue-producing capa-
bility of escheat. While the quantity is small compared to taxation, it is significant. For 
example, New Jersey grossed approximately $1,175,000 from her escheat statutes in 1957, 
at a collection cost of only $14,000. Id. at 1067. 
159 It is relevant to note the number of times tax cases are cited in escheat proceedings. 
Eight tax cases are cited in Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 439-40 (1951). 
160 "Power growing out of some benefit or protection conferred by the taxing state 
is now the constitutional standard of jurisdiction to tax." GooDRICH, CoNFLicr OF LAws 
§ 44, at 101 (3d ed. 1949). 
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But whatever its reasoning, the Court in Standard Oil elected 
to extend Harris v. Balk rather than to adopt Professor Beale's 
rationale. The result is that all the shortcomings which flow from 
the doctrines of collateral attack have been preserved to plague 
the holder and his attorney. 
IV. THE UNIFORM AcT SOLUTION 
One of the most comprehensive and complete solutions to the 
problem of multiple escheat is the suggested solution of the Uni-
form Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.161 This act is of 
great significance for two reasons: first, because it was specifically 
drawn for the purpose of meeting the problem posed by multiple 
escheat of abandoned intangible property;162 and, second, because 
it is essentially a repudiation of the present jurisdictional theories 
of escheat and an adoption of the power theory of Professor Beale. 
As the considered opinion of disinterested men whose product has 
met the acid test of approval in many state legislatures, its solution 
must be treated with deference. Acceptance of the act by seven 
states,163 and serious consideration by four more,164 within six 
years of its submission, despite its being more restrictive than 
present theories,1 65 amply demonstrates the wisdom of its framers 
and the seriousness of the problem of multiple escheat. 
In interpreting the act it is essential to bear in mind that it has 
two purposes: the prevention of multiple escheat and prevention 
of windfalls to holders. Since the possibility of multiple escheat 
arises only ·with abandoned intangible property, the act's scope is 
so limited. While present jurisdictional theories effectively pre-
vent windfalls, they give rise to the danger of multiple escheat. 
Professor Beale's theory prevents multiple escheat but it may allow 
windfalls, since escheat may not always be possible. What the 
framers of the act have done is to adopt Professor Beale's strict 
power theory of jurisdiction and to modify it to accommodate 
an important aim of escheat-the prevention of windfalls to holders. 
On its face, the act gives little indication of the jurisdictional 
theory it embodies. The key to the act is contained in a section 
providing for reciprocity: 
161 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK 
136-53 (1954). 
102 Id. at lll6-37. 
163 Arizona, California, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Virginia, Washington. 
164 Florida, Mississippi, Wisconsin, Texas. 
165 The Uniform Act is more restrictive because, among the enacting states, the state 
of the owner's last known residence will usually be the only state able to escheat. 
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"If specific property which is subject to the provisions of 
sections 2, 5, 6, 7 and 9 is held for or owed or distributable to 
an owner whose last known address is in another state by a 
holder who is subject to the jurisdiction of that state, the 
specific property is not presumed abandoned in this state and 
subject to this act .... "166 
All intangible property except that held by life insurance com-
panies,167 utilities,168 and state courts, public officers, and agen-
cies169 is covered by the provisions of this section. If every state 
adopts the act, this reciprocal provision will allow escheat only 
by the state of the mmer's last known residence, but only if that 
state has jurisdiction over the holder. This last limitation is dic-
tated by the overriding aim of escheat in preventing windfalls, for 
if the owner's state of residence cannot obtain personal service 
upon the holder, the state which can obtain such service 1\Till be 
allowed to escheat under the dual jurisdictional standards of sec-
tions 2, 5, 6, 7 and 9.170 The effect of the Uniform Act is thus 
to limit jurisdiction to the state which can get in personam juris-
diction over both the parties, whenever this is possible. This 1\Till 
be possible in many of the cases which raise the danger of multiple 
escheat because the danger arises primarily where interstate cor-
porations are holders.171 That this was the rationale of the framers 
of the act is borne out by the special treatment given to insurance 
companies in section 3, and the explanatory comment which limits 
jurisdiction for escheat to the last knmm residence172 of the person 
entitled to the funds: 
"In general, insurance companies qualify and are author-
ized to write insurance in many or most of the states of the 
Union. Therefore, jurisdiction over such companies as hold-
ers of unclaimed property is normally wide-spread through-
out the country .... "173 
166 UNIFORM DISPosmoN OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Acr § 10. 
167 UNIFORM DISPOSmoN OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Acr § 3. 
168 UNIFORM DISPOsmoN OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Acr § 4. 
169 UNIFORM D1sposmoN OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Acr § 8. 
170 E.g., § 2 provides: "The following property held or owing by a banking or financial 
organization is presumed abandoned ••• "; § 1 defines such organization to be those "en-
gaged in business in this state." 
111 The danger is proportional to the number of states in which the corporation is 
doing business. The danger will be reduced if the Supreme Court allows escheat proceed-
ings in only two states, that of incorporation and that of the owner's last known residence. 
172 The term "last known residence" is probably used in the Uniform Act to obviate 
difficult questions of proof which might be thought to arise if the term "domicile" were 
used instead. But cf. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LA.ws, 
HANDBOOK 145 (comment following§ 10) (1954), which suggests that the framers may have 
intended "residence" to be synonymous with "domicile." 
173 Id. at 141-42 (comment following § 3). 
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Thus, in the case where the possibility of multiple escheat is the 
greatest, the possibility of a windfall is the least, and the framers 
stick strictly to Professor Beale's theory of jurisdiction. 
Escheat of deposits held by utility companies is excepted from 
the general rule of jurisdiction by the state of the owner's last 
known residence because "recognizing the desirability of avoid-
ing a windfall by the utility, there is nevertheless a certain lack of 
equity in the acquisition of funds by a state other than that in 
which the services were rendered."174 This rather anomalous 
exception and separate treatment was probably prompted as much 
by the strength of utility lobbies in the state legislatures as it was 
by any inherent "equity."175 The exception of property held by 
state courts, public officers, and agencies176 is not explained, but 
the intimate connection they have with the state and the improb-
ability of such suit by another state seems a sufficient explanation. 
In the preceding section, certain objections to Professor Beale's 
theory of jurisdiction for the purposes of escheat were suggested 
as possible reasons for the Court's extension of Harris v. Balk to 
escheat. The way in which the Uniform Act meets these objec-
tions must be noted. First, while preference is given to the state 
of the owner's last known residence, if personal service on the 
holder cannot be obtained, another state is allowed to escheat. This 
prevents the possibility of a windfall to the holder, since some 
state will always be able to escheat. Secondly, the acceptance of 
the act by the states shows that, in their estimation, their interest 
in the property, in the sense of getting their quid for the quo of 
benefits conferred on the holder, is outweighed by the possibility 
of injustice to the holder by multiple escheat. "\i\Thile the possibility 
of multiple escheat is not entirely eliminated, since a second state 
may escheat if it can prove that the last known residence of the 
owner was there,177 the act appears to present as good a solution 
as is possible in our federal system. 
Aside from adoption of the Uniform Act, other solutions do not 
seem promising. At present it is clear that the holder's state of 
incorporation has jurisdiction to escheat, but it is not clear whether 
another state other than that of the owner's domicile has this 
174 ld. at 142 (comment following § 4). 
175 Cf. CAL. CIV. PROC. §§ 1500-27 which did not enact the Uniform Act provision for 
utilities. 
176 UNIFORM DISPosmoN OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Acr § 8. 
177 And, of course, the Uniform Act can have no effect upon escheat by those states 
not adopting the act. 
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jurisdiction.178 The decision in Connecticut Mutual was spe-
cifically limited to the domicile of the person entitled to the 
funds.179 While it is entirely possible that a third state which is 
neither the holder's state of incorporation nor the owner's domicile 
could be held to have sufficient contacts with the transaction180 
to enable escheat, the possibility of injustice to the holder through 
multiple escheat is so great that "traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice"181 require that escheat jurisdiction be 
limited to the state of the O"Wner's domicile and the holder's state 
of incorporation. This limitation is consistent with present 
decisions and would at least limit the danger to double escheat 
rather than multiple escheat.182 
Another possible solution is the insertion of a condition of de-
feasance in the contracts between the holder and the owner which 
transfers mmership of the intangible to the holder upon abandon-
ment.183 This solution relates to the termination of the obligation 
itself or the condition upon which the obligation arises. This is 
suggested by the opinion in State v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,184 
discussed in the preceding section. Its effectiveness depends upon 
whether escheat is held to impair the "obligation of contracts,"18G 
a question which is, as yet, unanswered.186 In view of the fact that 
such conditions would deprive the states of a significant amount of 
revenue if held effective, these conditions would at best probably 
be strictly construed and perhaps even declared void as contrary 
to public policy.187 
178But see Schoener v. Continental Motors Corp., 106 N.W.2d 774 (Mich. 1961) 
(Michigan held to have jurisdiction to escheat stock of nonresidents in corporation having 
its principal place of business in Michigan but incorporated under the laws of Virginia). 
179 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 550 (1948). 
180 As to the vagueness of the majority test, see the dissent of Mr. Justice Jackson, id. 
at 557-58. 
181 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
182 The only escheat case thus far decided by the Supreme Court which did not involve 
escheat by the holder's state of incorporation is Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 
333 U.S. 541 (1948). The strict limitation by the majority in that case would seem to 
allow argument that escheat jurisdiction must be so limited. But the very vagueness of 
the "contacts" test for personal service upon the holder would appear to permit a decision 
either way. 
183 See Ely, Escheats: Perils and Precautions, 15 Bus. I.Aw. 791, 803•04 (1960); Note, 
65 HAR.v. L. REv. 1408, 1409-10 (1952). 
184 56 N.J. Super. 589, 153 A.2d 691 (1959). 
185 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10. 
186 The argument has been repeatedly made and rejected, see e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. 
New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 436 (1951). But no express contract between the holder and 
the owner has yet been involved. 
187 It would appear that a distinction should be drawn, however, between a condition 
which prevents an obligation from arising, as in the Sperry b Hutchinson case, and one 
which terminates an obligation. A much stronger case is presented for the holder if an 
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The use of interstate interpleader under the Federal Inter-
pleader Act188 is often suggested. But even if this act were applic-
able,180 it is difficult to see how it would have any beneficial results 
under present theories. Although the dissenting Justices in the 
Standard Oil case have indicated that they wished to weigh the 
"interests" of the competing states,19° this is simply not consistent 
with the majority's theory of jurisdiction. It is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that the first state to serve process upon the holder 
is the only state with jurisdiction, and that the interests of the 
states could be weighed only if prior decisions were reversed.191 
Aside from the adoption of the Uniform Act, one suggested 
solution does have considerable merit. It is simply the enactment 
of an efficient and certain method for reimbursing the holder in 
case of escheat by another state. Very few states make adequate 
provision for this eventuality, although under present theories, the 
possibility is substantial.192 Such a provision seems essential to our 
notions of justice and fair play.193 Even the Uniform Act is not 
without fault in this respect, for the vagueness of the criteria194 
obligation which never existed is sought to be created by the state for the very purpose of 
escheat, than where the holder seeks to enforce a contract provision which, in effect, 
forfeits property of the owner. This is particularly relevant where this is done for the 
manifest purpose of avoiding escbeat. But there is a large area of uncertainty. E.g., an 
increased service charge might be made for unclaimed deposits in banks; this might or 
might not be reasonable. But in this area, it should be recognized that the state legisla• 
ture will probably have the last word, for the majority in Connecticut Mutual rejected the 
bolder•s claim of only contingent liability: "Unless the state is allowed to take possession 
of sums in the hands of the companies ••. the insurance companies would retain moneys 
contracted to be paid on condition and which normally they would have been required to 
pay. We think that the classification of abandoned property established by the statute 
describes property that may fairly be said to be abandoned property and subject to the 
care and custody of the state and ultimately to escbeat." 333 U.S. at 546. 
188 44 Stat. 416 (1926), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1958). 
180 See generally 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 22.01 •• 17 (2d ed. 1948). 
100 The majority of the Court in Standard Oil notes that "the details of the method 
of bringing other states and foreign countries before this Court for selection of the ap-
propriate sovereignty to receive the abandoned property are not elaborated upon" by the 
dissent. Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 443 (1951). 
101 It would seem that the only way the interests of the competing states could be 
weighed would be by a method analogous to the now discredited "single tax." Cf. Goon-
RICH, CoNFLicr OF LAws § 44, at 100-102 (3d ed. 1949). 
192 See Ely, Pennsylvania Escheat Laws: Proposals for Revision, 64 DICK. L. R.Ev. 329, 
344-45 (1960); Ely, Escheats: Perils and Precautions, 15 Bus. LAw. 791, 807 (1960). 
103 Such a provision would not be entirely without self interest, for recent decisions 
seem to indicate that the state must protect the holder against multiple liability before 
escbeat is constitutional. Cf. Cities Service Co. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330 (1952). 
194 UNI:ORM DISPOSmON OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Acr § 14 provides: "Any holder 
who has paid moneys to the [State Treasurer] pursuant to this act may make payment to 
any person appearing to such bolder to be entitled thereto, and upon proof of such pay-
ment and proof that the payee was entitled thereto, the [State Treasurer] shall forthwith 
reimburse the bolder for the payment." (Emphasis added.) 
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upon which reimbursement is conditioned could be the cause of 
needless and costly litigation. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Full faith and credit appears to be an inadequate tool with 
which to protect a holder of intangible property from the dangers 
of multiple escheat. While no incident of multiple escheat has yet 
been reported, the increasing recognition and use of escheat as a 
source of revenue by the states may be expected to produce such 
cases. The obvious injustice of multiple escheat requires a solu-
tion, and the most effective answer appears to be that of the 
Uniform Act. The Supreme Court could alleviate some of the 
hardship and danger to holders by placing a strict interpretation 
on Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, and thereby limit 
jurisdiction for the purposes of escheat to only two states. In-
dividually, to insure that repayment is prompt and certain, the 
states should reconsider their statutory provisions for reimburse-
ment to a holder in the not-unlikely event of multiple escheat. 
Clarold L. Britton, S.Ed. 
